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in many ways, but no single thing nor the totality of things includes everything or dominates over everything. The pluralistic cosmos is more like an individualistic society, without any Over-Individual, becoming more and more organized, while speculative philosophy claims that if we deal with the reality of realities, "everything is present to everything else in one vast instantaneous co-implicated completeness" (James).

Pluralism claims that there is nothing in life which is not complex, and that any one of its relations is only one aspect of it, or one way of looking at it. When it acts in that relation or connection it does not imply that it must act in all possible and actual relations simultaneously. For the pluralist things may act one way at one time and another way at another time, but, nevertheless, we still have a coherent cosmos in which each and every individual is a member and each and every individual builds the society: a coherent cosmos but not an organic interdependent unity.

It is in a pluralistic universe that teleological development is possible, that personality with its struggle toward the ideal is intelligible.

I may conclude suggesting a pluralistic theory instead of a monistic theory, not in order to solve the problems but rather to throw light upon the old problems and to create new ones.

A. J. SCHNEEWEISS.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

THOUGHTS SUGGESTED BY PROFESSOR PATTEN'S RECENT ARTICLE.

Not for a long time have I come upon so stimulating and deep-going an article as Professor Patten's in the April *Monist*, and I desire to set down some of the thoughts that have been suggested by it. My chief interest now is in the forming of some tenable conception of the elementary nature of things, and it is help in this direction that particularly attracts my attention. Professor Patten's view of deficit and surplus mechanisms and of the latter as relatively unspecialized (and in this connection the view of the contrasted functions of the nerves and the blood), his interpretation of dreams, the new angle from which he regards the problem of

the transmission of acquired characters—all these greatly interest me; but it is the underlying conception of energy and its ultimate meaning, the view of wishes and their efficiency, their modifying and even creative role in the world of living things—it is these ideas, whether as formally stated, or as implied or at least suggested, that I propose specially to consider. A kind of metaphysic, or the incipient stages of one, seems to me to be presented. This may not be Professor Patten's chief interest in writing the article, but it happens to be mine in considering it. Of one of his special contentions he remarks that they may be regarded as "mere theory," and I suppose I must admit that it is a mere theory that I am interested in tentatively working out here.

The starting-point is expressions of Professor Patten's like the following (for the context I must refer the reader to the original article): "...consciousness [in the simplest organisms] is a pulse passing from point to point on a surface. Its physical manifestation would be a temporary arm like the projections of an ameba. It is here, there, and everywhere in turn but nowhere has it continuity. The pulse rises at a given point and then sinks back to reappear at some other point. Each rising wave is an embryonic self quickly to be replaced by another, equally fugitive" (p. 226); "There is thus a continuity in the series [of successive forms or arms in which the wish appears] in the sense that a single wish is striving for fulfilment, but objectively considered they are a series of surface projections created by a passing pulse of energy" (p. 227); wishes are formally spoken of as "*on their physical side* surplus discharges" (p. 229—italics are mine) or "pulses of energy" (p. 233). The thought seems to be that the pulses of energy (or at least of surplus energy) are in their *inner being* wishes, the movements and the forms the movements take being simply the *manifestation* of the wishes. In other words, it is something of a psychical nature (I use the word in a loose, vague sense, but I cannot think of a substitute for it) that is fundamental, the physical side of it being derived or at least secondary.

I admit, however, that Professor Patten occasionally uses other language which looks as if the physical were regarded as the more fundamental. For example, "*on its conscious side* a pulse is a wish seeking fulfilment" (p. 227—cf. "pulses of energy are on their conscious side wishes," p. 232). More positively in this direction, fear and desire are spoken of as "*representatives* in conscious-

ness" of (respectively) the nerves and the blood (p. 229—italics in both cases mine). And at one point in his discussion he distinctly says that his view differs from that of the Freudians in tracing conscious phenomena to their physical background instead of referring them to a mysterious subconsciousness—"The content of consciousness is a reflection of the physical forces which underly it" (p. 230).

Still other language may be interpreted according to either view, e. g., "the wish which is a pulse of surplus energy" (p. 229), "the pulse rising in consciousness as a wish" (p. 227), "the pulse which is wish in consciousness" (p. 232).

How Professor Patten would finally define himself on the matter, I will not undertake to say—a thinker must be his own interpreter. But I may suggest a view that would measurably reconcile his varying utterances and make a tolerably consistent doctrine—he may assent to it and may not.

1. The fact may be that both ways of speaking are allowable. We may with equal propriety say "Wishes on their physical side are pulses of energy" and "Pulses of energy are on their conscious side wishes," the difference simply being in what we happen to start out by speaking of. In the one case wishes are in the foreground of our attention, and we proceed to say something about them, in the other pulses of energy are first in mind, and we proceed to say something about *them*. The wishes are what we (by "we" I mean now living organisms in general) *feel* or directly experience, the pulses of energy (understanding here outward movements) are what an onlooker (or for that matter we ourselves) might *observe*. Both ways of speaking might accordingly be unified in the following: What we directly experience or feel *manifests* itself to another (or conceivably to ourselves, by means of our outer senses) as a pulse or pulses of energy, i. e., some kind of movement that is visible and tangible. There are not two things, wishes *and* energy—but wishes are energy when viewed from the outside. Wishes are the reality, movements the manifestation. The manifestation is in one sense, indeed, as real as the original thing; only it is derived, secondary, not ultimate; the manifestation might cease (and certainly would, if there were no outside observer and we ourselves deprived of our outer senses) and the original none the less exist, while if the original ceased to exist, the manifestation would *ipso facto* vanish, whether outside observers, not to say ourselves, were on hand or not.

The difficulty of taking this as Professor Patten's view is in reconciling it with what he says of fear and desire as "representatives" in consciousness of the nerves and the blood, and of tracing conscious phenomena to their physical background—language naturally suggesting that the "physical" is taken as original and self-subsistent. I do not know whether it is sufficient to say (somewhat as in the preceding paragraph) that from one point of view fear and desire may "represent" the nerves and blood, while from another the nerves and blood may represent fear and desire; but this is about all I can say. But as to tracing conscious phenomena to their physical background, a word should be said as to just what Professor Patten has in mind in so speaking. He adds at once, "To me it is axiomatic that the content of consciousness is a reflection of the physical forces which underly it. No explanation is satisfactory which does not relate the content of consciousness to these antecedents" (p. 230). It is to be noted that it is the content of consciousness that Professor Patten is here referring to, and content of consciousness is not just the same as consciousness itself. The content of consciousness is what is *in* consciousness or is the object of consciousness, the *definite things* a conscious being is conscious about. Now the *content* of consciousness may well be made up (at least in the connection in which Professor Patten is speaking) of what physical forces give us, without thereby prejudging as to whether consciousness itself is a physical force or an outcome of such forces, or whether physical forces may not themselves be regarded as at bottom psychical in nature, after the manner of thinking of the preceding paragraph. Again, I do not know whether Professor Patten would agree to such a resolution of the difficulty.

2. In the theory I have advanced I may have enlarged somewhat beyond the field which Professor Patten particularly has in mind. His special subject is the wish, which he assimilates, or, shall I say: identifies, with *surplus* energy. However, he speaks of deficit energy (energy at the deficit pole of an organism) as well, and to him this energy has its psychical counterpart in fear—something conservative of energy as wish and desire expend or waste it. But fear, though contrasted with wish, is still something of the psychical order. Fear or wish make up in his view, as I gather, the determining impulses in an organic being—they shape, or shall I say: *are* the inner reality of, all its varied movements—this being as

true of the ameba as of the animal or man. The primacy of the psychical seems so far to be maintained.

Particularly interesting in this connection is what he says of structure. The *structure* of a living being is commonly regarded as something independent of the forces that operate in it or through it. Relatively speaking, it is so, and Professor Patten uses language to this effect. Wishes on the physical side are pulses of energy and not structure, he says (p. 233). He distinguishes between energy and the mechanism on or through which it acts (p. 225). But he also urges that changes of structure may arise and that these may come from the working or pressure of energy. Instead of being an ultimate, nowise the result of more primitive forces, he speaks of structure as caused by energy pulses (p. 231). He even says, "The wish creates structure" (p. 234). For all this, structure may be of different texture or material from energy, and language repeatedly used seems to sanction such a conception. For instance, he speaks of wish as becoming persistent only through structural aid, of its becoming "will" (defined as persistent wish) when "aided" by structure, of a primitive wish (as in an ameba) dying because without "mechanism to aid fulfilment" (p. 227). "The structure is our means of persistence," he says again, "the biological embodiment of primitive wishes" (p. 229). "Structure stabilizes energy, makes it move in particular directions" (p. 223). Language of this sort seems to imply that energy and structure are two separate things, however closely connected or reciprocally influencing one another.

Is there then an irreducible dualism in Professor Patten's conception at this point? I am unable to give an assured answer to the question and can only venture on a little reasoning. As already explained, he does distinctly assert the modifiability of structure. "Wishes modify structure" (p. 236). In advancing a view as to the way in which modifications of structure may be passed on to the next generation—a view very different from the ordinary one as to the transmission of acquired characters and which may almost be called revolutionary—this very clearly appears; the view is the most striking and daring contribution to modern speculative biology that I am acquainted with. According to it, inherited wishes are the central factor in inherited structure. "If wish can modify structure the difficulties of the theory of acquired characters can be avoided. Wishes modify structure, but the new structure has no

power to modify germ cell structure. It is the transmitted wish, not particles of the new structure, which modify germ cell activity and hence modify germ structure" (p. 236). In other words, the wish has a dynamic character extending to the very seats of life—it is, indeed, the dynamic agent; and perhaps this is what we mean when we speak of it as energy at all—the more material term but brings the real nature of the wish to light. But if wish may modify structure (whether in the soma or in the germ cells), may so far create new structure, why may it not create structure *ab initio*—I mean, what is the theoretical difficulty in the way? It may be said that wish (energy) must in the nature of the case have something to act on—if not structure, then the material out of which structure is shaped. This may be granted and we may still ask: what is it necessary to suppose that the material is? Down at bottom, may it not be other energy? Or, to use the corresponding psychical terms, may not wish act on wish—or, speaking more comprehensively, fear and wish act on fear and wish? Pluralism, or at least dualism, is inevitable to some extent—there is no shaping if there is not something to be shaped as well as the shaper—but the difference need not be one of *kind*. Professor Patten once says, "The structure is our means of persistence, the biological embodiment of primitive wishes. The will is not an ethereal something, but substantial bodily structure. It is wish objectified, not an entity dematerialized" (p. 229). Why may not this conception of will or wish be extended so as to cover what is of psychical nature in general, and this be held to be in its entire range no ethereal something, no entity dematerialized, but the very pulse and life, the inner being, of matter itself—matter being but its objectification, its appearance or manifestation to anything related to it or observing it from without?

A view going so far as this may not have Professor Patten's approval, and it is admittedly tentative and theoretical, but his own daring suggestions embolden me to indulge in it here—and I may add that it is closely akin to the view of two notable thinkers, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.

WM. M. SALTER.

SILVER LAKE, NEW HAMPSHIRE.